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ENSURING ABLE REPRESENTATION FOR
PUBLICLY-FUNDED CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS:
LESSONS FROM ENGLAND

Peter W Tague •
While there are skilled private defense lawyers who enthusiastically
represent indigent criminal defendants, 1 too often defense lawyers whose
income depends upon appointments provide deplorable representation. 2
The problem is well known and pervasive. In addition to the blizzard
ofclaims on appeal ofineffective representation, 3 defenders' efforts have
been savaged by judges4 and by fellow lawyers. 5 These nagging
problems persist: to induce private lawyers to represent their clients
effectively by eliciting the defendant's story and managing their
relationship iri a way that at least does not displease the defendant;
investigating his and the prosecution's positions; pressing the
prosecution for discovery, for concessions and to observe the rules; and
fighting at trial unless pleading guilty seems the much more advisable
choice.
Efforts to solve the dual problem of choosing the right lawyer and
ensurin~ that he behaves optimally have proven largely fruitless. One
answer, not yet explored, is to adopt a voucher system: the defendant
would choose the lawyer, and work out the terms of their relationship.
Might a voucher scheme induce able lawyers to compete to represent
indigent defendants? Might it provide a way for the defendant to
• Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, D.C.
I. Former members of public defender offices will often act in this fashion, as a number of my
friends do.
2. The focus is on private lawyers, not public defenders, in order to make the comparison with
barristers discussed below.
3. Ste Marvin E. Frankel, Curing ~ers' Incompetm&e: Primum Non Nocere, 10 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 613,619 (1977) (reviewing 400 claims).
4. Ste David L. Bazelon, The Rtalilies tifGideon and Argersinger, 64 GEO. LJ. 811, 812-13 (1976);
Warren Burger, The Spuial Ski/Js tifAdvocacy: Are Sp~ed Training and Certijicalion tifAdoocllW Ersenlinl /JJ Our
System tif]ustice?, 42 FORDHAM L REv. 227, 234 (1973) (estimating that as many as 50% of the lawyers
appearing in imP<>rtant cases were not qualified).
5. Ste Stephen B. Bright, Counselfor lite Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime butfor lite Worst
~er, 103 YALELJ. 1835, 1842 (1994). A recent report intended for international review draws similarly
alarming conclusions about death-penalty defense. Ste AMNES1YlNT'L, KlWNG WITH I'Rf;JUDICE: RACE
AND THE DEATH PENALlY IN THE USA (1999) ("Given the appallingly low standards of many courtappointed attorneys in numerous jurisdictions, there is an ever-present risk that minority defendants may
be represented by lawyers who are not only incompetent, but also openly bigoted.").
6. A second-to tie the lawyer's compensation to some measure of success-might also reduce
shirking and the lawyer's incentive to process cases by convincing defendants to plead guilty. But it would
have its own problems. Lawyers might risk higher sanctions for defendants, and waste resources, by
convincing defendants who should plead guilty to go to trial. As a result, such an arrangement is forbidden.
Ste MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(d)(2) (1983).
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monitor the lawyer's endeavors? The English model of choosing and
overseeing barristers, the lawyer who usually is the criminal defendant's
advocate, resembles a voucher scheme, and suggests that a similar
arrangement might work in the United States.
Before examining the English approach, it is useful to remember that ·
two other methods of reform have failed. The disgracefully low fees
paid to appointed defense lawyers could be enhanced considerably. 7
Trial courts could inspect the efforts of defense lawyers; appellate courts
could scrutinize claims of ineffectiveness. Both strategies have failed.
Legislatures will continue to resist enhancing defenders' fees, 8 even
though raising them could attract more able lawyers and could relieve
somewhat the difficult choice lawyers must make in allocating their time
as they approach the overall compensatory cap (to avoid working for
free if they pierce that cap). Trial judges are reluctant to query the
defense lawyer about his conduct, to learn whether he has made a
choice, let alone a sagacious one, not to undertake some act usually
expected. Appellate review of effectiveness claims is an inefficient and
unrealistic way of approaching the problem. The appeals process is
itself costly, and a reversal prompts an expensive second prosecution.
Reversals are unlikely, however, not because defense lawyers rerform
satisfactorily, but because the defendant's burden is so high. If the
wisdom of the lawyer's tactical decisions is not reviewed (and it would
be difficult to do so), and if the defendant must prove that the outcome
would have been otherwise if the lawyer had acted differently, courts
will reverse convictions only for conflicts of interest or for egregious
omissions. 10
A major problem with the current system is the absence of an
economic incentive for the defense lawyer to win or even to appear
interested in zealously representing the defendant. They are either paid
7. Virginia is not unusual in paying lawyers the princely maximum ofS845 (up from S735 in 1997)
for felonies carrying a potential prison term longer than 20 years and S305 (up from S265) for felonies
where the sanction is less. In the federal system a lawyer can be paid as much as S75 per hour for time in
court and S60 per hour for preparation, but in many districts the fees remain S60 and S45, respectively,
with a cap in all districts ofS3500. Su CriminaiJustice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (2000). ChiefJustiee
Rehnquist has even urged Congress to increase the fees, arguing that "[a)dequate pay for appointed counsel
is important to ensure that a defendant's constitutional right to counsel is fulfilled," but that current
"compensation rates still do not meet many attorneys' non-reimbursable overhead costs." Joan Biskupic,
Rehnquist's 'rear-End Report, WASH. POST,Jan. I, 2000, at A02.
8. While spending has increased over the last thirty years, increases in crime rates and in the
number of defendants represented by publicly-funded lawyers appear to have reduced per-defendant
expenditures. See William]. Stuntz, 1M Uneasy RelatWnship Between CriminliJProcedure and CriminalJustice, I 07
YALE LJ. I, 9-10 (1997).
9. The Supreme Court established the constitutional burden in Strickland v. W11Shington, 466 U.S.
668, 690 {1984).
I 0. Here I agree with Professor Stuntz's observations in his fine article. See Stuntz, supra note 8, at
20.
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by the hour, with a cap on the total possible award, or by a predetermined fee for all work, 11 or they receive no premium for winning
or even for exhibiting skill in defeat. And were a skilled performance to
enhance reputation, lawyers cannot capitalize on that to gain additional
appointments, 12 because nowhere do indigent defendants have the
power to choose their advocate. 13
Indeed, it might even be that defense lawyers who depend on
appointments for their income have an incentive to lose. This perverse
inducement could arise whenever the scheme for selecting lawyers was
not impartial. Judges who appoint lawyers have reason to avoid
appointing litigious advocates who advance many motions, undertake
extensive factual investigations and press for trials. It is less costly and
less contentious to appoint those who can be relied upon to persuade
defendants to plead guilty. Even aggressive defense lawyers might be
tamed by prosecutorial punishment, as prosecutors, for example, refuse
to extend plea offers or delay disclosing information otherwise given
earlier to more accommodating lawyers. 14
If the claim that appointed lawyers have an incentive to lose is
exaggerated, it is true that defense lawyers' incentives do not overlap
defendants' desires. The lawyer's incentive to litigate is often less than
the defendant's. Paying nothing for the lawyer's efforts, the indigent
defendant wants unlimited help. 15 Were the lawyer to follow the
defendant's desires, the lawyer would press issues when the costs and the
chance of winning did not justify the decision. 16 Even the zealous
lawyer has an economic target where, once reached, he wants the case

II. For examples, see supra note 7.
12. An exception might exist were a lawyer to qualify for more demanding cases, but this advance
is typically based on experience, not success. One: gains experience whatever the outcome.
13. Su Peter W. Tague, An Indigent's Right /IJ theAUomey ofHis Clwice, 27 STAN. L. REV. 73, 77-78
(1974).
14. Conversations with skilled lawyers, however, suggest instead that lax and unskilled lawyers, not
aggressive ones willing to fight at trial, are more likely to be cowed by prosecutorial pressure. A contentious
defense lawyer increases the costs of prosecution. Better for the prosecutor to provide discovery to him, my
commentators say, to avoid litigating a dispute. Lawyers who thrive by having clients plead guilty, by
contrast, earn no respect from the prosecutor, who provides them with little discovery and few
accommodations in the expectation that they will not review carefully whatever they receive, and eventually
will convince the defendant of the benefit of pleading guilty. The issue is how to encourage lawyers who
ordinarily avoid trials and pressurize their clients to plead guilty instead to press the prosecution when it
seems appropriate to do so.
15. Of course, the defendant may not recognize the opportunities to litigate, may be reluctant to
press the lawyer to act, or may have his efforts blunted by the lawyer's distance or indifference.
16. On the other hand, there is one motion--to suppress an identification-that is worthwhile even
though it will almost invariably fail in light of Supreme Court law. Su United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300,
318-19 (1973) (Sixth Amendment test read restrictively); Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 103-05
(1977) (same with due process test). Forcing identification witnesses to testify provides valuable discovery.
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to end, or at least his involvement with it. 17 That point arrives at the
very moment he reaches the cap on the fees set by the jurisdiction's
financial scheme. In federal courts, the cap in felony cases is $3500. In
those federal districts that pay $75 per hour, a lawyer can provide fortysix hours of work before he begins to work for nothing: enough time to
interview the defendant, perform the legal research, prepare the papers
and litigate a motion or two, and undertake an exploratory investigation
of the facts. Usually, this allows enough time to conclude that the
defendant is sufficiendy guilty to end the case by plea. But enough time
to investigate thoroughly a potential, albeit unlikely, factual or legal
defense? Enough time to conduct any but a very short trial? True, with
experience, and if skilled, the lawyer becomes practiced in. speedily
evaluating the alternatives and in implementing his choices. True, the
lawyer is less reluctant to mount a defense that threatens to pierce the
cap the more sure he is that his case will qualify for special treatment. 18
Yet, unless quite sure the cap will be ignored-but then again by how
much?-the risk is so high the lawyer will be working for nothing that
many must not mount the defense they would if representing a
defendant paying a higher fee. 19
An indigent defendant's desires can thus clash with the lawyer's
interests. No wonder there is tension in the relationship. No wonder so
many defense lawyers are accused, on appeal, of having acted
ineffectively for failing to have made a motion or investigate a point.
What is especially expensive is investigating and litigating defenses on
the merits. The expense is great in part because of the lack of discovery
in many jurisdictions. 20 In federal prosecutions, for example, under the
17. Obviously, lawyers can lose interest in a case for reasons other than money. The factual issues
might be uninteresting, the legal ones prosaic. The defendant might be overly demanding or
uncooperative.
18. The reported cases suggest judges are reluctant to exceed the cap. See Peter W. Tague,
RepresenJ.ing lndigtnls in Serinus Criminal Cares in Efwlarul's Crown Court: The Advocaus' Perfrmnonu and Incentives,
36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 171, 220 (1999). My anecdotal information, however, suggests that in certain
jurisdictions, like the Northern DistrictofCalifomia,judges routinely approve payments exceeding the cap;
elsewhere, as in the local court in the District of Columbia, fee requests are closely scrutinized and
payments over the cap are much rarer. A useful research undertaking would be to learn how often lawyers
are paid more than the cap and, when not, whether they limit their representation.
19. Ironically, a lawyer with time left under the cap has an incentive to file motions he expects to
lose, so long as his opportunity costs do not improve by attending to a different client. Moreover, one
(more?) contested hearing may impress, and satisfy, the defendant.
20. In England, by contrast, discovery by the Crown is much more generous than in federal courts,
set PETER W. TAGUE, EFFECTJVEADVOCACYFOR THE CRIMINAL DEFENDANT: THE BARRISTER VS. THE
LAWYER 196-203 (1996), even if, since 1996, the Crown is no longer automatically obligated to reveal all
of the material it will not use at trial. See Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act, 1996, ch. 25, pt. I,
§ 3 (Eng.). Failures to disclose useful evidence to the defense are now more possible. See Law Socie~ Calls
for UrgenlActiDn on Di.rclosure Failures, CRIM. PRAC. NEWSL.,july 1999. Barristers also do not need to spend
their time investigating; that is the solicitor's work. Thus, the per-case compensatory caps now in place
in England for paying barristers do not affect barristers as they prepare the brief supplied by the solicitor
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rules of criminal procedure the defense learns nothing about the
prosecution's witnesses until they testify, 21 and then receives their
statements only at the conclusion of the direct examination. 22 The
resulting lack ofinformation about the prosecution's case may cause the
defense to undertake investigation not needed when the prosecution's
evidence is revealed, to misdirect its efforts, or even to truncate an
investigation that might have born fruit even though the defendant
appeared guilty enough to justify accepting a guilty plea offer.
If investigation bears fruit, the defense lawyer, concerned that further
litigation will cause him to exceed the cap, confronts the difficult tactical
and ethical issue ofdeciding whether, during plea bargaining, to disclose
what he has learned in hope of settling the matter rather than of
entering a trial. If the bargaining fails, the lawyer may have revealed
information that risks compromising the defense at trial.
If the prospect of reform through increased remuneration or more
careful appellate grading of lawyers' performance is slight, a third
possibility-a voucher scheme-would draw on English experience by
attempting to better align the lawyer's incentives with the defendant's,
and the lawyer's with the public's desire for efficient representation that
nonetheless protects the innocent. A market could be created by giving
each indigent defendant a voucher to use in hiring a defense lawyer of
his choice. As we shall see, a voucher scheme increases the likelihood
a relatively able lawyer will represent the defendant, without necessarily
improving the defendant's ability to monitor his performance.

I. CHOOSING THE LAWYER
The power to select a lawyer will not be worth much if the defendant
lacks information about the experience and approach ofthose available.
An important reason for having courts select the lawyer for the .
defendant is the cost of information. To help the defendant learn and
assess the skills and performance oflawyers who practice criminal law,
the courts, or some agency, would need to compile detailed records
about the lawyers' experience, including, for example, a list of the
charges filed against his former clients and the cases' outcome, the
percentage of cases taken to trial or ended by plea, and the rate of
victory in trial.
A system like this gives the lawyers an incentive to win and to develop
a reputation for skillful and caring work, so that they will attract more
about the defendant's case. For the compensatory caps, see Legal Aid in Criminal and Care Proceedings,
S.I. 1996, No.2655. Sa also in.fra note 50.
21. Sa FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(2).
22. Sa FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.2.
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clients. A system like this also creates an incentive for lawyers to use
their time efficiently, since the amount of the voucher would not
increase with the number of motions flled. Conversely, it could also
create the temptation to do as little as possible because the lawyer would
be paid the full amount no matter how many hours are worked. But
offsetting that temptation is the lawyer's worry that shirking will tarnish
the lustrous reputation needed to attract clients. Lawyers worried that
an aggressive fight would consume the voucher (according to an
imputed hourly rate the lawyer intended to earn) might be led to discuss
with the defendant the various methods of contesting the prosecution,
and selecting, with the defendant, the ones that seemed most likely to
succeed. Defendants might in turn be expected to write a note
commenting about the lawyer's work, which would be added to the
materials future defendants would review about the lawyer.
Such a scheme is not fanciful, even if many problems in its
implementation can be envisioned, as discussed below. A voucher
scheme resembles the method of providing advocates to indigent
defendants in England's Crown Court, the court with general
jurisdiction over serious criminal charges. As in the United States, the
tension between ensuring adequate representation, but at a bearable
public cost, exists in legal aid cases in Crown Court. In Crown Court,
however, the structure of practice and the compensatory system are
better calibrated to attract able advocates to represent indigent
defendants. 23 Two structural features, now unknown in the United
States, are the defendant's ability to select a barrister,24 and to replace
him at will, and the barrister's concomitant obligation to accept any
brief, 25 known as the cab-rank rule. Like lawyers, barristers can decline
a brief if the fee is too low but, unlike lawyers, that reason does not
permit a barrister to escape representing an indigent defendant. The
Bar in England takes the position that legal aid compensation is
sufficient. Barristers do not rebel at this position because legal aid
compensation, at least in serious cases, is quite handsome, 26 when
23. The worl)' that the defendant will attack the advocate's representation on appeal is no more a
prod in England than in the United States, and for the same reason-the difficulty in satisfying the test.
SeeR. v. Clinton, 2 All E.R. 998, 1005 (C.A. 1993) (seemingly relaxing earlier need to show counsel's
performance was "flagr.tntly incompetent," but still requiring a showing that "all the promptings of reason
and good sense point[] the other way" [i.e., to a different choice]).
24. While solicitors may now also advocate for defendants in Crown Court, few do, and this
discussion thus focuses exclusively on representation by barristers.
25. The term "brier• refers to the package of instructions and documents the solicitor prepares for
the barrister, as well as to the solicitor's act of choosing the barrister ("to brier• a barrister).
26. That conclusion is based on my study of 63 cases being taxed-that is, the compensation was
being chosen-in the Old Bailey, London's celebrated Crown Court for criminal cases, in 1992. The
amounts paid, even in 1992, would make lawyers envious. For example, in the five-day trial of an
uncomplicated robbeJY, the defendant's Queen's Counsel received £5596, his junior £2934 and his
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compared with legal aid payments in the United States. 27 Thus,
defendants are able to choose from among the most able barristers
suitable for the defendant's exposure and need. 28
Vouchers in American courts would take one but not both of these
features of English practice: the right to select the advocate, but not the
accompanying expectation that the advocate will accept the request. 29
Another feature of vouchers would parallel a third indispensable part of
England's arrangement. Critical to the barrister's financial success is the
ability to attract briefs. Barristers are independent contractors; even in
legal aid matters they do not receive work, asprivate lawyers do in the
United States, by being chosen by a judge or court administrator to
represent an indigent defendant. Instead, they work only if chosen by
a solicitor, 30 who is the actual representative of the defendant. A
barrister must therefore develop a reputation among solicitors for
advocating effectively.
That is so even in less serious cases where solicitors do not always
choose a specific barrister, but instead send the brief to the clerk of a
barristers' chambers, authorizing the clerk to select the barrister. To
keep that solicitor's business for the other members of chambers, the
solicitor £2646, for a total of £11,176 (or $16,764 at £1 = Sl.SO). See Tague, supra note 18, at 220. The
lawyer would capture that entire amount because he does the work of the three representatives in England.
Set also Peter W. Tague, Ex Post Facto P~ in LegaJ!y-Aided Criminal Casu in the Old Bailey, 28 ANGLO-AM.
L. REV. 415, 417-23 (1999). The current government, however, is so alarmed at the spiraling costs of fees
in legal aid cases that it has announced plans to slash the· amount of payments. See Frances Gibb, Barrister's
Pf!Y Is Cut by Pounds 50m in Assault on Legal Aid, TIMES (London), Dec. 7, 1999, at I.
27. Under the formercompensatoryschemejunior barristers received rather low fees in standard-fee
cases Qike burglary, unless the trial were to last longer than three days). The basic fee for preparing the brief
and for the trial's first day was £214, and the payment for each succeeding day in trial, £153. When
compared with the payments in ex post facto cases, these payments were low. But juniors tolerated this
scale for reasons without relevancy to lawyers' incentives. Life as a barrister carries prestige. It also is rather
untroubled: the barrister undertakes no investigation (that is the solicitor's role), has minimal contact with
the defendant, does not solicit business (that is his clerk's job, if anyone's). And by performing well, young
bar~isters hope to attract the attention of solicitors, and eventually of Queen's Counsel and the judges who
will recommend them for elevation to the rank of Queen's Counsel.
28. The link between the cab-rank rule and the Bar's acceptance oflegal aid payments as sufficient
would appear to enable every indigent defendant to compete with wealthy defendants to select the most
able barrister. It does not work quite that way, however. For example, a defendant charged with a burglary
could not brief a Queen's Counsel because those senior members of the Bar will be paid to appear only in
prosecutions for murder or when the "case is one of [such) exceptional difficulty, gravity or complexity ...
that the interests of justice require ... the services of two counsel." Legal Aid in Criminal and Care
Proceedings, S.I. 1989, No. 344, reg. 48(2)(a) and (b). For a discussion, see Tague, supra note 18, at 177.
29. One could require lawyers who participate in a voucher scheme to accept cases unless too busy
properly to defend a defendant who chose him or her. While including a cab-rank rule might make a
voucher scheme more efficient to administer, the defendant could also be expected to list, say, three lawyers
he would like. It should not prove too difficult to contact the second, or the third, choice if the others were
unavailable. Hence, the cab-rank rule need not be adopted tO achieve the benefits of a voucher scheme.
30. In less serious cases, however, solicitors sometimes send the brief to the clerk of a barristers'
chambers, authorizing the clerk to the barrister. To keep the solicitor's business the clerk has an incentive
to entrust the brief to an able barrister.
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clerk has reason to entrust the brief to an able barrister. In turn, that
barrister has reason to impress the solicitor, in hope of being selected
directly by the solicitor in the future. Being briefed directly frees the
young barrister from relying on the chambers' clerk to continue to direct
business, increasingly more challenging and remunerative to him.
Once chosen, a barrister who displeases the solicitor or the defendant
risks being fired in that case and, more disastrously, risks losing the
solicitor as a source of :work. At the present, by contrast, a private
lawyer may continue to receive appointments, often no matter how
woefully he performs. With the power of selection the defendant might
better control the lawyer, just as the solicitor has the means to control
the barrister.
In theory the English system is so much better than the American: a
professional (the solicitor) selects and supervises a professional advocate
(the barrister), who must agree to accept the brief; each has an expei:tise
in defense, the solicitor in preparing,31 and the barrister in presenting it.
The barrister does not reject the brief because the compensation is
acceptable. Another feature, also unknown in the United States, and
not part of a voucher scheme, is the solicitor's role of monitoring the
barrister to ensure that he provides the expected service. Indeed, the
solicitor or his representative attends the barrister in court, to help as
·needed, to act as a liaison between the two, and, supposedly, to grade
the barrister's performance for use in deciding whether to brief him in
the future.
If the solicitor is skilled in selecting the barrister, how does the
defendant select a solicitor? The indigent defendant in Crown Court
may be no more schooled in making this choice than is his American
counterpart were he to choose a lawyer. Do the advantages of the
English process diminish if the defendant selects an incompetent
solicitor? The English system seems to work, 32 however, in part because
31. The solicitor inteiViews the defendant, obtains the official papers and the discovery provided
by the Crown, may seek advice from the barrister about witnesses to subpoena and any investigation to
pursue, undertakes that investigation, and writes the brief indicating the defendant's position on the facts
and his desired outcome, and, if the brief is done well, identifying the legal and factual issues and offering
ideas on research, cross-examination and final argument. For an example of how helpful an excellent brief
can be, see TAGUE, supra note 20, at 44 n.144.
32. The Lord Chancellor's Department and Legal Aid Board are in the process of establishing a
scheme to contract with solicitors' firms to provide all seiVices in publicly-funded criminal cases. See
Criminal Defence SeiVices, Introducing Contra&Lrfor Criminal Defence Seroices wiUz J:.au(yers in PrivaJe Pra&lice (Aug.
1999) (on file with author); Lord Chancellor's Department, Modernising Justice 10-11 (1998) (on file with
author). While this form of franchising will limit the defendant's choice of a solicitor to those with a
contract, it should increase the likelihood the solicitor will perform as expected. The process of obtaining
a contract will involve monitoring by the Government to ensure the delivery by the solicitor of skilled
representation. Thus, this innovation, while limiting the defendant's previously unfettered ability to choose
any solicitor, should reduce the information problem a defendant now has that might lead him to select an
incompetent solicitor.
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the solicitor's work is more circumscribed than the lawyer's, 33 and, more
importantly, because the solicitor has a hefty incentive to select an able
barrister.. If the solicitor can find a barrister whose temperament and
skills fit the defendant's personal and legal needs, the barrister can make
the efforts of a plodding or harried solicitor look better. 34
The English scheme, then, far better aligns the barrister's incentives
with the defendant's than is true in American jurisdictions. In practice,
however, these salutary features often fail to work, but not for reasons
germane to a voucher system. All too frequently the barrister, often on
the eve of trial, withdraws, 35 thus forcing the solicitor to scramble to find
a replacement. The origin of the problem of the returned brief lies in
two assumptions: barristers, as skilled advocates, need scant time to
. prepare, so long as the briefhas been assembled appropriately; and trial
judges must continuously be overseeing a trial. The effect of these
assumptions is to schedule cases for trial without much regard for the
barrister's calendar or the defendant's desire to have a particular
barrister represent him. If the barrister is unavailable when the trial is
scheduled, often on very short notice, the barrister returns the brief, 36
and a replacement must be found. Because of the first assumption,
barristers are regarded as fungible. The defendant loses the barrister
whom he came to trust and respect, 37 but the replacement is in theory
no less talented and is also subject to the same incentive to perform well.
Nonetheless, problems could arise. Because so many briefs are
returned, barristers, at least in the less serious cases, may delay
33. The solicitor's need to investigate is less than the lawyer's, for example, because the Crown's
obligation to disclose its evidence is wider. See TAGUE, supra note 20, at 196-203. Extensive discovery is
an advantage because solicitors are reluctant to interview the Crown's witnesses for fear of being charged
with obstruction. See id. at 137 (noting that lawyers would be disturbed at this possible failure to prepare
the defense thoroughly).
34. One worry is that the barrister will protect a floundering solicitor to avoid antagonizing a future
source of work.
35. This is called "returning the brief." Defc:nse briefs are returned 50% of the time. SuGENERAL
COUNCIL OF THE BAR, STUDY OF REMUNERATION OF BARRISTERS CARRYING OUT CRIMINAL LEGAL
AID, Annex B, Table BS, at B7 (1985) (on file with author). The rate remains the same in this decade. See
ROYAL COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, CROWN COURT STUDY, 1993, Cmnd. 2263, at 54
(48% of defense briefs returned). For a discussion of the returned brief, see TAGUE, supra note 20, at 12836; Tague, supra note 18, at 205.
36. The returned brief is not a problem in the United States; lawyers are usually able to obtain a
continuance if occupied elsewhere or not ready to proceed.
37. On the other hand, because briefs are returned so frequently, barristers invest little effort in
many cases. Thus, defendants often meet the barrister for the first time on the day of, or immediately
before, the trial, at least in the less serious cases that do not receive a fixed date for trial. See ROYAL
COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, CROWN COURT STUDY, 1993, Cmnd. 2263 (in over half the
contested c·ses the first meeting did not occur until the day of trial; where the defendant decided to plead
guilty on that day, the figure rose to 70%). In another study defendants who met the barrister before trial
usually did so only once, for I 0 to 60 minutes, but frequently a different barrister, whom they had not met,
would appear at trial. See jUSTICE, MISCARRIAGES OFjUSTICE: A DEFENDANT'S VIEW 2 Uune 1993).
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preparing until very near the trial date. Because they are not
compensated, at least in the less serious cases, for preparation when the
brief is returned, barristers are inclined not to prepare unless sure they
will be able to appear in the case. 38 By delaying his preparation, the
barrister does not participate in the solicitor's preparation of the defense,
and something may thereby be overlooked. Or, the replacement, with
little time to prepare, could overlook something, or might evaluate the
defense very differently, advising the defendant that a tact the first
barrister thought was promising is fruitless. In that case he might even
gloomily urge the defendant who expected to fight to plead guilty
instead. The defendant, unsure about the skill ofthe replacement whom
the solicitor might not know, 39 and confused by the inconsistent advice,
must then make the stressful decision to plead or to press an
unenthusiastic barrister for a trial.
These problems in England form impediments to effective defense
advocacy. The returned brief subverts the defendant's right to select the
barrister. The barrister's performance may be hindered, .too, by
incomplete information and "inadequate time for preparation. Yet these
are problems indigenous to the English court and professional structure,
unknown in American courts. They would not accompany the English
system of selecting the defendant's representative, were it to be adapted
to American conditions in the form of a voucher.

II.

MONITORING PERFORMANCE

Even if the power to select an agent improves the likelihood an able
lawyer will represent the defendant, the problem of monitoring his
performance remains. The defendant may not know what to expect
from the lawyer, nor how to evaluate what the lawyer does do. A
voucher scheme does not necessarily address this problem.
The purported solution in England again involves the solicitor. As
the solicitor is supposedly able to choose a barrister whose demonstrated
skills match the defendant's needs, so by continuing to intercede
between defendant and barrister (for the barrister's client is technically
the solicitor, who retains him) the solicitor can oversee the barrister's
performance. The threat of termination in the case and loss of briefs in

38. For a discussion, see TAGUE, supra note 20, at 131-32.
39. This would occur ir the clerk or the chambers or the withdrawing barrister round the
replacement ror the solicitor. And the defendant may not be helped by the solicitor, who could press the
replacement ror an explanation of his different position. As discussed immediately below, the solicitor may
not attend the conrerence where the replacement meets the derendant, sending instead a representative who
may not know much about the case, if even about the law.
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the future, as discussed in Part I, provide a powerful incentive for the
barrister to perform appropriately.
With no solicitor to help monitor the lawyer, the defendant in the
United States is on his own. Help might come by providing the
defendant (and the lawyer) with a list of the various steps a thoughtful
and skilled defense lawyer would consider taking in every case: 40
motions to suppress evidence or to sever counts or defendants, for
example, or types of investigation. In conference, the defendant and
lawyer could discuss why the lawyer had elected not to pursue some
potentially fruitful and relevant procedural step. For instance, the
lawyer might explain that he had not sought a separate trial for the
defendant because fingering the co-defendant as the sole or principal
culprit would be easier if they were tried together.
Apart from a checklist, a voucher might itself provide some leverage
fot the defendant in monitoring performance. Aware that his grade
would turn, in part, on how he counseled the defendant, the lawyer has
reason to negotiate the allocation of authority between him and the
defendant. 41 The lawyer who believes it is better for him to make the
decisions (over whether to call a witness, or advance a defense, for
example) would need to justify this to the client; the lawyer who was
equivocal about ceding authority to the defendant would have reason
to do so. Whether the lawyer's performance would improve is unclear;
that the defendant would feel better about the representation is almost
certain. 42
Educating the defendant about the tactical decisions that must be
made is not as effective a review of the advocate's performance as one
undertaken by a second trained advocate (the solicitor). 43 In practice,
however, solicitors usually do not monitor as expected. They bow to the
barrister's supposedly vaunted adversarial prowess, and let him make all
the decisions, without protecting the defendant from the barrister's
insistence that the defendant plead guilty, or without protesting when,
at trial, the barrister ignores the defendant's desires in making a tactical
decision. 44 And at trial barristers are often not overseen, and rarely
40. For an example or such a list, see Peter W. Tague, 1M AUempt to Improve Criminal Defense
15 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 109, 164 & n.285 (1977).
41. See Rodney J. Uphoff, Slralegi& DtciriDTU in tJu Criminlll Case: Who's .ReaJ!y Calling tJu Slwts?, CRIM.
jUSTICE, Falll999, at4, 5 (discussing lawyer's response to the two approaches in the text).
42. SeejONAllfAND.CASPAR,CRIMINALCOURTS: THEDEFENDANT'SPERSPECTIVE30-38(1978)
[hereinarter CRIMINAL COURTS]; jONATHAN D. CASPAR; AMERICAN CRIMINAL jUSTICE: THE
DEFENDANT'S PERSPECTIVE 100·25 (1972) [hereinarter CRIMINALjUSTICE].
43. Solicitors' advocacy experience has been in the magistrates' court, prosecuting and derending
crimes that might loosely be termed misdemeanors in American courts. There are no jury trials in
magistrates' court. Until the last decade barristers had a monopoly over appearing as advocates in the
Crown Court. Solicitors now have that right, too.
44. See, e.g., R. v. Ensor, 2 All E.R. 586 (C.A 1989) (Queen's Counsel chose not to apply to sever
~n,
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helped, by the solicitor's obsexvation or advice. Because not paid at
their rate of compensation for .attending trial, .solicitors send as a
substitute a much more junior person, indeed sometimes someone not
schooled in the law at all. 45 When such a person attends the barrister,
the advocate is effectively on his own, with that person of use to the
barrister only to communicate with the solicitor in case a need for
assistance arises.
The method of payment-an hourly rate or a flat fee for all aspects
of representation-introduces a different problem of monitoring, one of
more interest to the jurisdiction that must compensate the defender than
to the defendant. Time spent in court can be monitored; time taken to
prepare out of court cannot be. Payment by the hour does not
encourage shirking but instead unneeded preparation (or prevarication
about the time taken to prepare). An alternative is to pay a predetermined, bulk amount no matter what the defender does or does not
do. This arrangement encourages shirking. The defender prepares less
than appropriate, seeking to maximize per•hour return.
The English have tried both approaches, and their experience reveals
the problems with each. The conversion from an hourly rate to a flat
fee in magistrates' court led, as one would predict, to under-preparation
by solicitors/6 and thus possibly to a less-than-appropriate defense.'H In
Crown Court, per-case rather than per-hour fees are one reason briefs
are returned so frequently. With no payment for preparation in less
serious cases, barristers delay preparing and thus invest little if anything
in keeping the case. On a given day they take the brief that conforms
to their schedule, not to the defendant's needs or expectations. In
serious cases, where fees were calculated after the fact, in light of the
case's seriousness and difficulties, barristers were presumed to pad the
time they said they took to prepare. Fee requests in these cases were
slashed, on the assumption the case could have been prepared more
efficiently. 48
counts even though defendant specifically requested that such a motion be made). Ensor limited to its facts
an earlier case where the Court of Appeal had reversed a conviction when the barrister, without consulting
with the defendant, did not call two alibi witnesses he had called at the first trial. SeeR. v. Irwin, 2 All E.R.
1085, 1085 (C.A. 1987).
45. For a discussion, see Tague, supra note 18, at 193,216-17.
46. See Alastair Gray, Paul Fenn & Neil Rickman,AnEmpiricalAnll{Jisir oJSltuulard F«S in Magistrates'
Cotnt Criminal Cases 15 (Aug. 1999) (on lile with author).
47. See id. ("To the extent that inputs pess preparation] can be linked to the quality of output
[performance], something we cannot confirm, it is possibk that an inferior product was supplied as a result
of standard fees.").
48. See Tague, supra note 26. This sketch of the methods of compensating defenders in publiclyfunded criminal cases in England is sufficient for our purposes. The English experimentation with methods
of payment is much more complicated, and told elsewhere. See Peter W. Tague, &anomie lncmtives in
&presenling Publicly-FUIIIkd Criminal Dtfmdants in Englnnd's Crown Court, 23 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 1128 (2000).
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What the English experience portends for a voucher scheme is
unclear. 49 This is another feature of the scheme that poses problems in
implementation. The most that can be said here is that a jurisdiction
would need to choose between the different problematic incentives
created by the different approaches, as the English now have.
Selecting the method of payment is not the only problem posed by a
voucher scheme. We tum to others in the next section.
Ill. PROBLEMS IN IMPLEMENTING A VOUCHER SCHEME

Apart from the nature of the payment-per-hour or per-case--there
is the issue of appropriate compensation. Assume a per-case payment
were adopted. It might be necessary to adopt the English approach, in
the graduated fee scheme, whereby varying amounts are paid to reflect
differences in the likely difficulties of cases. Nonetheless, the defense, on
the facts of a given misdemeanor, could demand more effort and more
skill than that of a particular felony. But making such a refined estimate
would be extremely difficult without an evaluation of the facts. And the
prosecution, in a jurisdiction that has stingy discovery rules, would be
unenthusiastic about disclosing its evidence to help with such a
calculation. Moreover, who would make such a judgment of each case?
Perhaps only someone skilled, like a judge, could be entrusted to make
the assessment, but judges would not tolerate such mundane work. As
a result, as in England, the different amounts might need to be pegged
to a standard, like the potential sanction, that would be roughly
appropriate in most cases. 50 Murder cases, then, might merit a voucher
of ten thousand dollars, armed robberies five thousand dollars, and
misdemeanors one thousand dollars.
But such a scale might work on its own, without a voucher system, to
attract more able lawyers, for differentiation of this sort depends on
increasing the fees for certain categories ofcases. And legislatures would
be less inclined to such a change even if it would promise better
49. The current English approach is to pay a pre-determined amount for preparation and the trial's
first day (the basic fee), with the amount varying depending on which of nine categories the seriousness of
the offense fits into. Se8 Legal Aid in Criminal and Care Proceedings, S.I. 1996, No. 2655. Calculating the
fee ex post facto is now limited to cases longer than 10 days, soon to be extended to 25. The Lord
Chancellor has chosen to ignore the risk that barristers will shirk in order to correl the overall costs oflegal
aid in criminal cases. The reason was the extraordinary size of certain ex post facto payments, with I% of
the cases consuming 40% of legal aid spending in Crown Court criminal matters. See Criminal Defence
Services, En.ruring (zyali!JI aml Controlling Cost in Very High Cost Criminal Cases para. 2.0 (Aug. 1999) (on file with
author).
50. Under the graduated fee scheme, for example, the basic fee for robbery, a class C offense, is
£240 and for aggravated burglary, a class B offense, £311. For examples of the payments indifferent cases,
see The Lord Chancellor's Dept., Guidant:t to .Dtlelmining O.JJicers on tJu Gradualed Fu Schml4.for AdvocaU.r in tk
Crown Court aml Example Fu CakulatiDns (Mar. 1997) (on file with author).

HeinOnline -- 69 U. Cin. L. Rev. 285 2000-2001

286

UNIVERSITY OF CLNCLNNATI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

representation, and more inclined to simply increasing the hourly rates
and compensatory caps that currently exist. Perhaps differentiation
would work if the overall cost did not increase. This would be so
because less-serious felonies, with fees lower than what is now possible,
in a jurisdiction with a current cap of three thousand dollars, would
outnumber murder cases. But, then, will popular lawyers refuse to
represent those defendants whose voucher is for only two thousand
dollars, leaving them with the same lawyers now imposed upon them?
To put that point differently, a voucher scheme, without attendant
increases in the levels of fees, might simply reshuffle the allocation of
work among the lawyers currently toiling in publicly-funded cases. It
would not entice more able lawyers who have found better opportunities
for their talents in better paid, private work, criminal or other. Hence,
the pool of available lawyers will not necessarily improve with a voucher
scheme. 51 If so, the advantage of such a scheme would come down to
improving the control the defendant would have over the lawyer's work,
and thus increasing his satisfaction with the process. 52
Another problem would be the time needed for defendants to select
a lawyer. 53 In a large jurisdiction with many lawyers, it would take time
for a defendant to review information about the lawyers, and to arrange ·
his choices in order (in case his first or subsequent picks were not
available). Delay might arise in setting release conditions for an
incarcerated defendant, or even in scheduling an arraignment when the
lawyer could be available. And it would prove frustrating for defendants
who needed to approach a second, then a third, even a fourth lawyer,
in the absence of a cab-rank rule, to find a lawyer willing to appear.
The popularity of certain lawyers might cause problems. England
can clear the docket of cases by refusing to grant continuances. The
lack of availability of the barrister chosen by the defendant is not a
reason to postpone the trial. One barrister is as good as another. Cases
proceed to trial, or to plea on the day scheduled for trial, with a different
51. This explains the hesitation expressed earlier that a voucher scheme might enable a defendant
to choose only a relatively able lawyer-relative to the others in the shallow pool.
52. See CRIMINAL COURTS, supra note 42, at30-38; CRIMINALjUSTICE, supra note 42, at I 00-25.
53. A refinement might limit choice but decrease the chance the defendant would err in selecting
a lawyer with inadequate skill or experience. Similar to the franchising scheme about to be implemented
in England, su supra note 32, the jurisdiction could grade lawyers, and place them in categories, so that
fewer lawyers would be able to be chosen, say, in murder cases than in burglaries. Such an effort, of course,
would improve the current methods of selecting lawyers. This feature is not needed in England. The
solicitor would not choose a barrister who lacked experience or skill. And if the clerk of the barrister's
chambers received the authority from the solicitor to select a different barrister in chambers, he would
refrain from selecting an inadequate replacement for fear the solicitor would direct no more business to the
chambers. That said, the clerk may choose a replacement with a little less experience than the barrister
chosen by the solicitor, in hope of convincing the solicitor that this second barrister, if he performs
appropriately, is another person for the solicitor to brief.
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barrister, whether prepared or not. A voucher scheme rejects the
assumption that lawyers are interchangeable. And American courts give
continuances to lawyers who are busy elsewhere. If a small number of
lawyers were disproportionately popular, dockets would lengthen, as
they sought continuances. Denying continuances would create the
English system of returned briefs, were the lawyer to hand the case to
another, a person whom the defendant had not chosen. Or, facing the
threat of a denial of a continuance, popular lawyers, to retain the
voucher, would find themselves pressured to urge defendants to plead
guilty, or not to prepare as thoroughly as they might. Over time, a
voucher scheme. might therefore slowly begin to resemble the present
arrangements. If a voucher scheme's incentives worked as expected,
however, this problem of too few popular lawyers would not arise.
Enough lawyers would have developed a reputation for appropriate
representation to spread the work widely among the local bar.
Yet, even if one or more of these problems were to occur, they are not
likely to prove overwhelming. In jurisdictions with public defender
officers, for example, private lawyers are typically appointed only when
the public defender must withdraw because of a conflict. Private
lawyers are not appointed, as a result, all that frequendy. If, say, private
lawyers appeared in only one in five cases, the delay might not be
protracted as defendants studied the resumes of the lawyers, and court
personnel notified the lawyer chosen. Moreover, if enough lawyers
presented a convincing dossier of their abilities, the problem of a skewed
distribution of appointments, with the accompanying pressures on the
docket, could also be avoided.
CONCLUSION

The voucher system would bring benefits. Lawyers would escape the
thumb of judges or court personnel upon whom they relied for
appointments. They would have an incentive to improve their skills, to
litigate more aggressively, and perhaps to plea bargain less frequendy.
If they did urge a guilty plea, they would be more inclined to explain in
detail to the defendant its justification. Even if lawyers' performances
did not markedly improve, defendants would be happier with the
process; those who choose their lawyers are more pleased with the
lawyer's performance, no matter whether that assessment is objectively
justified. And under a voucher scheme, the control that indigent
defendants feel they now lack would be likely to continue beyond the
moment of selecting the lawyer. Monitoring might thereby improve.
A voucher scheme is not without difficulties. Of the various possible
problems, the most important is the size of the payment. If payments
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were not raised, the pool oflawyers might not change. Yet, raising the
levels might obviate the need for a voucher scheme, although the
defendant's ability to monitor the lawyer's performance might improve
because defendants would have reason to score the lawyer's
performance for future selection (even were lawyers selected by the
judiciary). On balance, a voucher scheme might provide the most
promising way to improve representation for indigent defendants
represented by private lawyers. 54

54. To test whether this was so, another feature of the English approach could be borrowed, the
pilot project. The Lord Chancellor's Department (LCD) commonly tests innovations in a few jurisdictions,
to see whether they provide the expected benefits. At the moment the LCD envisions pilot projects for
contracts with solicitors' firms to provide the range of services in criminal cases and for pubic defender
offices. Conversations with members of the LCD and of the Legal Aid Board. Hence, in a large urban
jurisdiction in the United States a voucher scheme could be tried in one or more of the trial courts with
jurisdiction over part but not all of the population. In Alameda County, California, for example, the
scheme could be tried in the courts in Hayward and Fremont, but not in Oakland. Or, in New York City,
test it first in Staten Island before implementing it in Manhattan.
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